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TOWARD AN AUGUSTINIAN LIBERALISM 
Paul J. Weithman 
Concern with the vice of pride is often thought contrary to the spirit of 
liberalism. Among the virtues often ascribed to liberal political institutions 
is their encouragement of self-assertion and a sense of self-esteem. Moreover 
Judith Shklar has argued, in Ordinary Vices, that liberalism requires neglect 
of pride and of the other deadly sins of medieval Christianity. Instead, she 
argues, liberals properly concern themselves with restraining the vices that 
she, following Montaigne, dubs ordinary-cruelty, treachery, snobbery, and 
hypocrisy. 
In this paper I argue, on the contrary, that the vice of pride poses political 
problems in a liberal democracy. A properly Christian concern with checking 
the vice of pride, I argue, gives Christians reason to embrace political liber-
alism. More specifically, I argue that observing liberal constraints on political 
advocacy ameliorates some of the political problems to which pride gives 
rise. The liberalism that results has some claim to be called "Augustinian," 
for Augustine thought pride the worst of the vices and thought its restraint 
the primary function of political authority. 
The title of this paper no doubt elicits some measure of surprise and con-
fusion, for Augustine's name and his doctrines are no longer the common 
coin in political philosophy that they once were. l Moreover, the term "Au-
gustinian liberalism" will strike those familiar with Augustine's politics-as 
he developed them during the Donatist controversy,2 for example-as oxy-
moronic. The political theories historically associated with Augustine and 
Augustinianism have not, after all, been notably tolerant. Finally, the qualities 
of character liberalism fosters-among them tolerance and self-assertion-
might be thought antithetical to Augustinian Christianity. There are, however, 
arguments to support political liberalism that can appropriately be described 
as Augustinian and the aim of this paper is to lay them out. Before turning 
to them, it will prove helpful to state what I mean by the term "political 
liberalism" and to say to whom I am offering these Augustinian arguments. 
I 
"Liberalism" has been and continues to be used to denote a widely extended 
family of political and philosophical positions that differ in significant re-
spects. The element common to this family is often said to be an overriding 
concern for the rule of law and for the personal and political liberties of 
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conscience, speech, assembly and of the press. The common element is some-
times said to be a commitment to rights that guarantee freedom to exercise 
these liberties.3 Still others characterize liberalism by the political agenda 
that these philosophical positions are deemed to entail. My own working 
characterization, however, takes as central to political liberalism4 neither 
rights, liberties nor agenda, but a criterion of the legitimate exercise of public 
power.s 
Of course it is not peculiar to liberalism to argue that power ought only to 
be exercised legitimately. But there are distinctively liberal principles of 
political legitimacy, principles that restrict the reasons and values that can be 
appealed to when justifying the exercise of public power if that exercise is 
to be legitimate. Political liberalism as I shall understand it is a position 
characterized by fidelity to one or another of the members of this family of 
liberal principles of political legitimacy. An adequate characterization of 
political liberalism as I understand it therefore requires adequate character-
ization of what is common to the restrictions various liberal principles of 
legitimacy impose. 
Jeremy Waldron has located at the foundations of liberalism the "demand 
that the social order should in principle be capable of explaining itself at the 
tribunal of each person's understanding. "6 This demand suggests that liberal 
principles of political legitimacy have in common their insistence that exer-
cises of public power are legitimate only if they can be justified in terms that 
"explain [themselves]" to every citizen. David Lyons makes a similar sug-
gestion, saying that the justification of public policy must be "accessible" to 
everyone.' 
These broad characterizations leave ample scope for disagreement among 
liberals about which values and principles do and which do not legitimate the 
exercise of public power; the literature of recent liberalism reflects this dis-
agreement. John Rawls inclines to the view that public power is legitimately 
exercised only when it can be justified by appeal to a range of values on 
which all could agree and which are peculiar to what he calls "the domain 
of the political. "8 Robert Audi's arguments suggest that he thinks exercises 
of power legitimate only when they can be justified by what he calls "secular 
reasons"; to appeal to religious values or principles is to offer reasons that 
not all citizens do or could accept. But Audi seems not to insist, as Rawls 
does, that legitimating reasons appeal only to values that are distinctively 
political.9 The great Catholic liberal John Courtney Murray, on the other 
hand, seems to have held that some religious propositions and values can 
legitimate the use of public power in the United States because he thought 
that there are some religious values or propositions all Americans, at least, 
could come to accept.lO 
Ample room also remains for disagreement about those to whom the exer-
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cise of power must be justified or justifiable. Rawls suggests that such exer-
cise need by judged legitimate only by those who are or are trying to be 
reasonable. II Bruce Ackerman seems to think that agreement must be reached 
among all contending parties whether or not they regard one another as 
reasonable. Still others who are liberal by Waldron's criterion-Seyla 
Benhabib, for example-worry that any standards of reasonableness framed 
prior to the process of justification tend uncritically to legitimate the status 
quo and so do not really legitimate at al1. 12 
Fortunately, I need not adjudicate among competing liberal principles of 
political legitimacy. For my purposes, it suffices to note that political liber-
alism addresses those who live in a society of moral, religious or philosoph-
ical pluralism and attempts to narrow their disagreement about the use of 
public power. It attempts to do so by defending restrictions on the invocation 
of moral, philosophical or religious beliefs and values to legitimate the ex-
ercise of public power. The restrictions on beliefs and values are to be re-
strictions on which all, or all reasonable, citizens could come to agree because 
liberalism is premised on the view that at least the most significant exercises 
of public power must be justifiable to all or to the reasonable. 
In what follows, I shall be concerned with the implications of political 
liberalism for political advocacy, for citizens' advocacy and defense of the 
use of public power. For a citizen to be a liberal requires that her political 
advocacy conform to one or another liberal principle of political legitimacy. 
The liberal citizen therefore adduces no reasons for the exercise of public 
power that would render that exercise illegitimate by the standards of one or 
another liberal principle of political legitimacy. A Rawlsian liberal would 
appeal only to political values in her political advocacy, an Audian liberal 
would not appeal to religious reasons and a Murrayan liberal, while permitted 
appeal to some religious beliefs, would not appeal to narrowly sectarian 
propositions or to those that depend upon revelation. I shall argue that there 
are Augustinian reasons for imposing some liberal restrictions on one's po-
litical advocacy and defense and so to be a political liberal, provided others 
do likewise. Before proceeding, however, some qualifications and explana-
tions are in order. 
First, I have in mind only political advocacy that is recognizably argumen-
tative. Verbal but non-argumentative political advocacy, as is found in drama, 
poetry, music and graffiti,13 to take but four examples, would have to be 
considered in a full theory of legitimacy and political advocacy. So too would 
the non-verbal political expression of the visual arts, dance, flagburning and 
vigils of silent prayer. But having noted their importance, I shall prove myself 
no exception to the unfortunate philosophical trend of ignoring non-argumen-
tative political expression. 
Second, I am concerned only with political advocacy by ordinary citizens. 
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The role of judges whose opinions have the force of precedent, for example, 
no doubt imposes special requirements on those who happen to be judges, 
especially on religious jurists. Judicial advocacy and defense of the exercise 
of public power therefore requires special treatment and would exceed the 
scope of this paper.14 
Third, I am not going to argue that citizens need in fact be moved by the 
reasons they adduce for the exercise of political power. A citizen counts as a 
liberal, in my view, if the argument in which her advocacy consists is liberal; 
this is compatible with her being moved even by highly idiosyncratic reli-
gious, philosophical or moral views.l~ 
Finally, I am not going to argue that there are overriding Augustinian 
reasons to be a political liberal, just that there are good Augustinian reasons. 
I therefore leave aside the very difficult question of whether someone whose 
political advocacy is illiberal thereby violates a moral obligation or fails to 
be a good citizen. 
My arguments are intended to show that Christians have reason to accept 
some form of political liberalism. The arguments are premised on an Au-
gustinian analysis of pride. I shall argue that Christians, because they have 
religious reasons to curb their pride, have reason to be concerned with the 
political manifestations of that vice and that Christians therefore have reasons 
to value the humility and restraint fostered by conforming their political 
advocacy to a liberal principle of political legitimacy if others do the same. 
Further, if pride is understood according to this Augustinian analysis, all and 
not just Christians have reasons to check their pride. All, therefore, have 
reasons to value the humbling and restraining effects of political liberalism. 
My arguments linking liberalism and concern with pride are not intended 
to move those in all times and places. They are directed at those who live in 
what might be called maturely pluralistic democratic societies. These are 
societies with a democratic political culture and democratic institutions and 
traditions. They are characterized by what Rawls has called "the fact of 
pluralism": they are societies composed of those who adhere to diverse phil-
osophical, religious and moral conceptions of the good life. They are, finally, 
societies without institutional barriers that prevent adherents of minority 
views from learning enough about their own or the democratic tradition to 
engage in reasoned political argument. Augustinians in societies with histo-
ries of minority repression or without democratic institutions may have good 
reason to be liberals, but they do not have the reasons to which I shall appeal. 
II 
Augustine's views on the origin and purposes of political society and on 
the legitimate uses of political authority are extremely complex. I cannot do 
them justice here; surely the political liberalism for which I will argue departs 
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significantly from Augustine's political thought in some respects. 16 Even so, 
labelling this liberalism Augustinian is not without fidelity to Augustine's 
own views or to the tradition of their interpretation. 
First, Augustine himself numbered the human tendency to pride among the 
legacies of original sin. He believed that political authority was instituted as 
a consequence of and a remedy for original sin and he numbered among the 
primary functions of political authority the humbling of its subjects. 17 Indeed 
it is in part because Augustinian politics ascribes this function to political 
authority that liberals-most notably Judith Shklarl8-have tried to distance 
themselves from it and to supplant an Augustinian moral psychology stressing 
pride with an alternative psychology thought more congenial to liberalism. I 
want to suggest, on the contrary, that a concern with the vice of pride and 
with the consequent need for humility provide reasons for accepting political 
liberalism as it is discussed in the previous section. This stress on the hum-
bling function of political liberalism qualifies the liberalism defended as 
Augustinian. 
Moreover, that liberalism is Augustinian insofar as the account of pride on 
which it is premised is of Augustinian provenance: the essentials of that 
account are laid out in Augustine's works. Unfortunately, Augustine's own 
account is somewhat unsystematic. Its central elements were later masterfully 
combined and harmonized by Aquinasl9 and it is therefore on Aquinas's 
developed account of Augustinian ideas about pride that I rely. 
The pride that Christianity has traditionally considered the deadliest of the 
deadly sins is often thought of as contempt of God or as a desire to cast God 
down and to put oneself in His place. The paradigms of pride so conceived 
are Adam and Eve in their commission of original sin and Milton's Lucifer 
in his rebellion against Divine sovereignty. Aquinas thinks that human beings 
do sometimes act from intentional contempt of God and His law. He is, 
however, committed to the view that pride is a pervasive moral phenomenon, 
found in a wide variety of faulty human acts.20 
Pride, Aquinas says, is a failure to subject oneself to God and to the rules 
He has ordained.2 ! Aquinas thinks that a failure to observe God's commands 
and a turning away from God toward what Aquinas calls "commutable goods" 
is the very nature of sin. He therefore thinks that every sin is, in effect, a 
failure properly to subject oneself to God; he concludes that every sin how-
ever motivated and whatever its object is, in effect, a sin of pride. 
But this account is insufficient for Aquinas's purposes. While it does ex-
plain a rather weak way in which pride is present in every sinful act, Aquinas 
wants an account of pride that has explanatory power, one in which pride 
explains sinful acts and is not merely shown by them. Some of this explan-
atory power is provided by Aquinas's account of how pride removes imped-
iments to immoral action. Aquinas thinks that intentional violation of moral 
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rules requires some explanation. Here, he thinks, pride can have an explan-
atory role, for among the manifestations of pride is thinking oneself above 
such rules. Pride can thus remove the impediment to sin posed by a prima 
facie inclination to observe moral rules. 
Even this account, however, is not enough. Aquinas thinks that pride is not 
only present in or explains many sinful acts, but also motivates them. 
Aquinas's commitment to pride's pervasiveness as a motive therefore requires 
a more nuanced account, one that will accommodate the Miltonian view of 
pride but also one which shows how wide a variety of acts pride can lead 
agents to perform. The key to this account is Aquinas's specification of 
pride's characteristic motive. 
Aquinas argues that the characteristic motive of acts of pride is an undue 
desire for what he calls "one's own excellence." He does not have in mind 
an undue desire for one's own perfection or for the fulfillment of one's 
potential. Rather acts of pride are primarily motivated by an undue desire for 
preeminence or superiority. This undue desire for preeminence or superiority 
can, Aquinas concedes, be accompanied by a contempt for those over whom 
superiority is sought. This contempt can be for God and His commands; but, 
Aquinas insists, pride can also engender contempt for other human beings.22 
It is, however, crucial to Aquinas's account of pride that contempt, whether 
for God or man, is not the motive primarily associated with pride. The pri-
mary motive remains undue desire for preeminence. To appreciate the variety 
of acts pride can engender, it is necessary to appreciate the variety of acts 
one could be led to perform by such a desire. This undue desire can show 
itself in two ways. 
An undue desire for superiority, Aquinas would say, is sometimes a desire 
for undue superiority, a desire for moral, spiritual or intellectual goods that 
human beings cannot attain. It is to this undue desire for superiority or 
preeminence that Aquinas would appeal to explain how acts of pride can be 
attempts to attain equality with God or to usurp His place: the goods desired 
are goods that properly belong only to God and it is an essay in usurpation 
for a human being to desire them for herself. Most often, Aquinas believes, 
the usurpation of God's place is unintentional and acts attributable to pride 
are not chosen under descriptions that refer to usurpation. They are instead 
chosen from a desire for the moral, spiritual or intellectual good in question. 
What makes the consequent acts acts of pride is that the goods desired are 
desired as a means to superiority. 
Adam and Eve's original sin therefore exemplified extraordinary pride. 
Adam and Eve, Aquinas says, wanted to be like God inasmuch as they wanted 
the undue spiritual good of being able to prescribe moral rules for them-
selves.23 The extremity of their pride, he thinks, consisted in their knowingly 
trying to be like God. Thus does Aquinas's account enable him to accommo-
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date the Miltonian view; thus also does it make of the Miltonian view an 
extreme and not a typical case of pride. 
Pride of this first sort may be accompanied by a contempt for God, since 
the proud person implicitly denigrates Him in the attempt to make herself in 
some respect His equal. Just as it is rare for someone knowingly to try to 
usurp God's place, so it is rare, Aquinas thinks, for someone consciously to 
hold God in contempt. Indeed his interpretation of the Fall, according to which 
Adam and Eve wanted to make moral rules for themselves, suggests as much. 
If they were contemptuous at all, Aquinas's interpretation suggests, their con-
tempt was primarily for God's commands and only secondarily for the God who 
commanded. And even in Adam and Eve's case, their original sin was motivated 
not by their contempt, but by desire for their own superiority. 
Aquinas also argues that there is a second sort of undue desire for superi-
ority or preeminence, an undue desire to be superior to other human beings 
in some respect or for the power over others that superiority often confers.24 
A vice closely related to pride so understood, Aquinas says, is that of vain-
glory; the vainglorious person is moved by a desire that others praise and 
acknowledge her preeminence and power. Aquinas does not, however, think 
that the objects of vainglory and of this second sort of pride-superiority and 
power, praise and acknowledgement-are the intended objects of many of 
the acts properly described as acts of pride or vainglory. Few acts of these 
vices, Aquinas would say, are chosen from a desire for these objects that the 
agent herself recognizes .. Often acts of pride and vainglory masquerade as 
acts of other vices-acts of seizing more money than one needs or is one's 
due, or foolhardy acts on the battlefield. What makes the act in question one 
of pride or vainglory rather than of injustice, intemperance or rashness is that 
an undue desire for superiority, power or praise is the appropriate explanation 
for seeking too much money or taking too many risks in battle. Because 
people can excel or gain the advantage over others in so many ways and by 
the use of so many objects from possessions to battlefield victories, pride of 
the second sort can, like pride of the first sort, lead the proud person to 
perform any of a variety of sinful acts. 
Pride of the second sort, like pride of the first, can be accompanied by 
contempt. Attempts to secure preeminence over others can be accompanied 
by contempt for them, contempt for God or contempt for moral rules. But 
Aquinas thinks that what makes an act one of pride is the role that desire for 
one's own superiority plays in that act's explanation. 
In summary, then, Aquinas therefore argues that in one sense, every sin 
regardless of agent or motive, is a sin of pride. He further argues that pride 
is needed to explain someone's knowing violation of a moral rule. And 
Aquinas argues that, because so many wrong acts can be means to attaining 
superiority, an undue desire for one's own superiority can motivate an agent 
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to perform any or many of a wide variety of wrong acts. Indeed Aquinas says 
that pride can motivate someone to a wrong act of any kind. 
Despite the fact that pride can explain so wide a variety of human failure, 
there are classes or "species" into which Aquinas thinks acts of pride can be 
sorted: imputing to oneself some good one really does not have, reputing oneself 
to have attained some good on one's own merits, failing to acknowledge the 
excellence or help of another in the attainment of some good and seeking to 
excel others in some material, moral, intellectual or spiritual good that one 
should have in the same way they do. Aquinas describes these classes of acts 
rather abstractly, but it is plausible that acts that fall into them are acts one 
would perform to usurp God's place, to gain preeminence over others or to 
assure oneself of one's own superiority. His description of the classes of acts 
associated with vainglory is more concrete; he numbers among what he calls 
the "daughters" of vainglory hypocrisy, discord, contention and pertinacity. 
Aquinas's analysis indicates how pride motivates offenses against God and 
other human beings. The links he sees among contempt for rules, contempt 
for God and man, and desire for superiority over either or both suggest the 
corrosive effects of pride on the passions of the proud person. Certainly 
contempt for moral rules and a belief that one is above them can lead, not 
only to their violation, but also to the habit of excusing oneself for the 
violations. This, in tum, inhibits proper function of the moral sentiments of 
guilt and shame. Contempt for moral rules can also prevent proper responses 
to the good works of others that are worthy of admiration; and the habit of 
excusing oneself for having acted badly makes it more difficult properly to 
appreciate forgiveness granted by others. Contempt for others distorts the 
moral sentiments so that sympathy, pity and remorse are not properly felt on 
the occasions that call for them. Insofar as the proper operation of the moral 
passions is part of a well-lived human life and contempt born of pride impedes 
them, pride is a fault both the religious and the non-religious have reason to 
avoid. 
There are several features of Aquinas's account that are especially worthy 
of mention. 
First, Aquinas thinks that appeal to pride is often required to complete the 
explanation of wrong action; in the vast majority of such cases, however, the 
agent believes herself motivated by interests or desires other than those as-
sociated with pride and vainglory. Indeed Aquinas might say that pride has 
so pernicious an effect on human character precisely because it flourishes in 
the dark, artfully playing a background and supporting role in the perfor-
mance of wrong actions. 
Second, while Aquinas recognizes that acts of pride can be acts directly 
against God, he also thinks that pride and vainglory engender wrongs done 
to other human beings-taking too much or credit for too much, slighting 
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others to seem superior oneself, fighting, cleaving obstinately to one's own 
opinion from a desire to win an argument. This is as true of pride that 
contemns God as it is of pride that contemns man. 
Third, this rich account of pride suggests ample reason for reckoning pride 
a vice. Those who do not believe in God will abhor pride because it hurts the 
proud and carries in its train contempt for one's fellow man. They will see 
pride as a vice of ambition and domination that impoverishes the emotional 
life and fathers a number of offenses against other human beings. Those who 
do believe in God will share these sentiments, but have distinctively religious 
reasons for wanting pride checked. They will believe that God takes offense 
at all the wrongs pride engenders and will want to avoid the contempt for 
God and for His commands that pride sometimes entails. The religious and 
the non-religious can overlap in their condemnation of pride as Aquinas 
explicates it, though the religious have additional reasons for curbing that 
vice. 
What I earlier alluded to as the Miltonian picture of pride as willful at-
tempts to usurp God's place has important implications for political theory. 
That pride so understood is the worst of wrongs is a claim that might seem, 
and has seemed to many, to stand in no need of justification. And, it might 
be thought, it is this claim and the Miltonian view of pride that together 
support Augustine's view that a primary function of political authority is the 
humbling of those subject to it. 
Judith Shklar has argued that political liberalism must reject this Augustin-
ian view of political authority and the claims about pride that support it.25 It 
is essential to liberalism, she argues, to ignore the deadly sins identified by 
Patristic and medieval Christianity and to deplore instead the vices she, fol-
lowing Montaigne, dubs "ordinary." Cruelty, treachery, snobbery and betrayal 
are, she intimates, more ordinary than the deadly sins in three senses. First, 
they are ubiquitous vices. Everyone can lapse into them because they do not 
demand the great strength of character that Satan's rebellion required, the 
knowing defiance of God. Second, they are vices the acts of which are 
directed against other creatures rather than against the creator. Finally, the 
claim that the acts these vices engender are wrong requires no justification 
beyond pointing out that they visit harm on other creatures. 
Of the ordinary vices, Shklar argues, cruelty must be reckoned the worst 
because pain and the fear of pain are the worst harms humans can inflict on 
each other. Since to be a liberal is to be concerned with the ordinary and not 
the deadly vices, liberals "put cruelty first," hate it most of all and deny that 
political authority should be concerned with pride's restraint. Indeed the 
hatred of cruelty, Shklar argues, provides the most compelling reason to be 
a liberal for it is definitive of liberal regimes to shun state-sponsored cruelty. 
On the other hand, she argues, the Christian hatred of pride gives little reason 
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to endorse a liberal politics: history testifies that those who hate pride and 
not cruelty most of all often resort to "pious cruelty" to restrain offenses to 
God.26 
Perhaps a novel or film in which characters exemplify pride and vainglory 
would better bring these vices to life than does Aquinas's discussion of them. 
Philip Quinn has argued that readers of Albert Camus's The Fall, for example, 
gain direct and vivid acquaintance with pride through the self-revelation of 
the novel's protagonist, the judge-penitent.27 But if Aquinas's analysis lacks 
the vividness and impact of a great novel, his discussion of pride, vainglory 
and their offspring can still do much to refine our moral categories and 
sharpen our moral perceptions. Certainly his discussion provides a picture of 
pride that is far more subtlely shaded and finely grained than is the Miltonian 
portrait of that vice that Shklar's argument takes for granted. Indeed the 
picture of pride Aquinas sketches is of a subject quite "ordinary" in its 
potential for motivating wrongs done to others. 
Pride as Augustine and Aquinas understand it is first of all ordinary in its 
commonness. It is a vice, they would maintain, that motivates a wide variety 
of human acts in a wide variety of human beings. The knowing rebellion of 
Satan may have required extraordinary strength, but the ordinary pride and 
vainglory of everyday life do not. It is also an ordinary vice in that many acts 
of pride are acts directed in the first instance against other human beings and 
not against God. They are often motivated by contempt for other creatures 
or by a desire for superiority over them. Those who regard harm done to other 
creatures as ipso facto wrong therefore have reason to think pride a vice. 
Pride's ordinariness thus far understood does not, however, imply that 
concern with pride supplements the reasons those who put cruelty first have 
to be liberals. More important, it does not imply that those who put pride first 
have, in their abhorrence of pride, some reason to be political liberals. I want 
now to argue, therefore, that embracing political liberalism in what I have 
called "maturely pluralistic" societies helps contain or ameliorate the vice of 
pride. Those who are concerned with pride, whether for religious or secular 
reasons, have reason to accept liberal constraints on their political argument. 
III 
Aquinas's Augustinian account of pride, vainglory and the vices associated 
with each provides a helpful guide to the temptations posed by engagement 
in any kind of argument. Arguments can, after all, be highly competitive 
affairs and the winners often enjoy a sense of their own superiority. Some-
times too they enjoy the acknowledgement of their intellectual superiority by 
the vanquished or their auditors. Undue attachment to these spoils of victory 
can lead one to argue for the wrong reasons, to endorse bad arguments, to 
refuse to listen to the interlocutor. This is no doubt why Aquinas numbered 
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the argumentative vices of contention, discord and pertinacity among the 
daughters of vainglo~y. 
Temptation can be especially strong in political argument, for the winners 
of political argument can enjoy rewards that are especially attractive. Among 
the spoils that go to the victor are political power and acknowledgement of 
power exercised by oneself or by a group to which one gives allegiance. By 
moving one to intransigence and pertinacity, undue attachment to these goods 
can severely hinder the sort of consensus-building that subsequent social 
cooperation requires. 
The restraint demanded by political liberalism is one effective check on 
these manifestations of pride. Liberal principles of political legitimacy im-
pose restrictions on the reasons that can be offered to justify or advocate the 
use of public power and do so precisely to foster the civility of argument 
threatened by unrestrained pride, contentiousness and discord.28 To the extent 
that simply barring certain reasons from political argument makes that argu-
ment more civil, consensus-building is advanced and intransigence and per-
tinacity are curbed. 
An interest in civil political argument motivated by attachment to social 
goods rather than individual domination provides a reason for restraining 
pride and endorsing liberalism that anyone can accept, whether Christian or 
not. It is, however, a reason that should have special purchase on Christians, 
at least on Christians sympathetic to Augustine's discussions of original sin 
and its effects. These Christians should, as a result of their sympathy with 
Augustine, already be sensitive to their own undue attraction to the prospect 
of dominating others and aware of their need to curb it. Aquinas's treatment 
of pride brings home the facts that this attraction can subvert any argument 
and that the goods available in political argument pose a special temptation. 
Liberalism, insofar as it fosters habitually restrained pursuit of victory in 
argument, fosters habitual restraints on the desire to dominate others. It 
should therefore seem especially attractive to Christians Augustinian in their 
view of original sin. 
Moreover, recall that Aquinas's analysis warns us of hypocrisy by including 
it among the likely consequences of vainglory. That hypocrisy could ulti-
mately be rooted in pride seems a plausible piece of moral psychology. The 
proud person, Aquinas says, is inclined to attribute to herself goods, including 
moral goods, that she does not have; the vainglorious person seeks a reputa-
tion for goodness of one sort or another. The hypocrite ties pride to vainglory 
by trying to secure a reputation for qualities pride leads her to affect or 
exaggerate. The religious hypocrite wants to be known for religious goods-
for a sanctity, a closeness to God or a religious uprightness-that she does 
not possess. Argument, including political argument, provides an occasion 
for religious hypocrisy by providing the opportunity for seeming to argue 
472 Faith and Philosophy 
from religious motives that one really does not have or that are not as strong 
as one would like others to believe. Robert Audi's especially strong form of 
liberalism forbids political argument from religious motives. Adherence to 
Audi's liberalism therefore has in its favor that it removes the near occasion 
of religious hypocrisy. Adherence even to a weaker form of liberalism, one 
that forbade appeal to religious reasons in political argument, would also 
remove the occasion of religious hypocrisy since political argument would 
not afford the opportunity to show allegiance to a religious position. 
The disruption of political argument may seem an obvious way in which 
pride poses political problems; at least it is obvious once Aquinas's associa-
tion of pride with vainglory and the argumentative vices is before us. There 
are other areas in which Aquinas's Augustinian account of pride is a more 
valuable guide because it points out dangers we might have been prone to 
overlook. It is here that Christians and non-Christians part company, for in 
what follows I shall be especially concerned with temptations to pride that 
politics poses for Christians and with the helpfulness of Aquinas's discussion 
in indicating where those temptations lie. 
These dangers arise when Christians engaged in political argument appeal 
to the whole truth as they see it. They arise, for example, when Christians 
argue from religious reasons for public policy that they think is required by 
their Christian commitments, that they think is necessary to make their soci-
ety a Christian one or one in which they think themselves best able to lead 
a Christian life. The danger pride poses to such arguments is not only, as in 
the cases discussed earlier, that it can lead one to continue the argument for 
the wrong reasons or that argument will break down because of the pride of 
those involved. Adopting and adducing religious reasons for religiously-in-
spired political positions can themselves be acts of pride. The Christian and 
the non-Christian can overlap in or concur on the need to hold pride in check 
because of its adverse political consequences; the Christian, however, has 
further religious motivations to restrain her pride since she knows that it 
offends God. 
The first of the species of pride Aquinas distinguishes is that of imputing 
to oneself goods, especially moral or spiritual goods, that one does not really 
possess. This species includes, presumably, imputing to oneself moral or 
spiritual goods that one cannot or ought not have, but which belong only to 
God. Such arrogance is clear in the advocacy of perfectionist political pro-
jects, projects in which political power would be employed to eradicate sin 
or to impose on human beings political institutions that their fallen nature 
makes it impossible to sustain.29 Only God could make the fundamental 
changes in fallen human nature necessary for the maintenance of these insti-
tutions, and it would be an act of pride for human beings to suppose they 
could do so. Moreover, many defenders of religious liberty have argued that 
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religious faith is a gift from God and that it cannot be compelled even by 
political coercion or the threat of repression. It seems to follow from these 
claims that advocating attempts to coerce belief is an act of pride because it 
is an attempt-often unwitting-to do what only God can do. 
But the advocacy of less radical political programs can also be an act of 
pride. Those who believe themselves chosen by God as His instruments to 
purify society or to rid it of features that seem contrary to the demands of 
Christianity, for example, are sometimes moved to advocate the use of public 
power to eliminate what they find objectionable. The belief that one has been 
chosen as a Divine instrument tempts one to think that God has done so 
because of one's own spiritual worthiness for the purpose, to think that one 
enjoys special favor with Him or a special proximity to Him. It tempts, that 
is, to attribute to oneself a spiritual or moral good that one cannot be sure 
one has and, sometimes, a good that one does not have. Insofar as beliefs and 
desires connected with these mistaken attributions motivate political advo-
cacy, that advocacy is an act of pride. 
A similar invitation to pride lies in the belief that America is a country 
especially favored by God or one in which the Biblical prophecies concerning 
Israel are to be fulfilled. These beliefs enjoy some contemporary currency 
and have a long history in popular American political thought and culture. 30 
They are beliefs that can and have in the past motivated political advocacy 
for they can lead and have in the past led some to suppose that they should 
function as God's instruments to help America fulfill the purposes He has for 
it. I have already discussed how advocacy motivated by belief that one is 
God's instrument can be an act of pride. 
Finally, determining what policies a well-functioning political society re-
quires is obviously extremely complicated. Drawing from a religiously-based 
conception of a well-lived human life political values, principles of justice 
or specific public policies for a society composed in part of those who do not 
share that religious view is extremely difficult. That difficulty results in part 
from the fact that drawing such implications requires a significant amount of 
political theory. Even if one's religious view straightforwardly implies the 
immorality of acts of a certain kind, for example, a great deal of argument is 
required to support the conclusion that such acts should be legally prohibited. 
This argument must take up some of the thorniest questions of political 
theory: those concerning the nature and functions of law and of political 
authority. 
Political advocacy based solely on one's religious view can be an act of 
pride if accompanied by failure to acknowledge both one's own fallibility in 
very difficult matters of political theory and practical politics. Christians who 
accept a doctrine of the Fall ought to be especially worried about pride of 
this sort. That doctrine is often taken to imply that human capacity to delib-
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erate about moral truth is hindered or impaired, and that self-interest and the 
desire for power often impede moral reasoning. The more difficult forms of 
reasoning, about practical politics and other matters far removed from the 
substance of revelation, might seem to be especially imperiled. In these areas, 
Christians ought to be most sensitive to their readiness to believe that, far 
from being corrupted by original sin, they have special facility in political 
reasoning that absolves them of the need to take seriously the arguments of 
others. They ought, that is, to be especially sensitive to their propensity to 
pride in these cases. 
I have adduced a number of reasons for thinking that resort to religious 
grounds in political argument can be an act of pride. I have thereby adduced 
a number of reasons Christians might have for being political liberals. How 
compelling those reasons are depends, of course, on whether the political 
benefits of religiously-based argument outweigh the risk of pride such argu-
ment poses. Many Christians, perhaps, believe that the potential results of 
such political arguments do outweigh the attendant dangers. They deem their 
reliance on religious argument necessary to outlaw abortion and pornography, 
and to achieve racial and economic justice. These results, they may think, 
would be so great that they will or should run the risk of pride in order to 
secure them. 
This line of anti-liberal reasoning depends on the supposition that the only 
arguments available to support the policies Christians favor are religious 
arguments. It is worth recalling, however, that the political theory of liberal 
democracy is over three centuries old and has been articulated in an atmo-
sphere of intellectual and political freedom. Indeed this long history of de-
velopment under reasonably favorable intellectual conditions accounts for the 
maturity of the pluralism I discussed earlier. 
As a result, liberal democratic theory is by now extremely well-developed 
and contains ample resources for the criticism of extant regimes that purport 
to realize liberal and democratic ideals. Certainly the theory of liberal de-
mocracy has sufficient conceptual resources to criticize institutions and prac-
tices of racial injustice. It therefore has sufficient resources on which to base 
arguments for policies to implement racial equality. Perhaps Rawls's greatest 
contribution to the political philosophy of liberal democracy is that of draw-
ing out its implications for the just distribution of income and wealthY 
Rawls's work thus testifies to the availability of arguments for economic 
justice that are "internal" to liberal democratic theory. Susan Moller Okin 
argues that a commitment to liberal democracy has profound implications for 
the division of labor within the family.32 John Courtney Murray argued that 
it required public funding of parochial schools.33 
The diverse implications that ideals of liberal democracy have been taken 
to have holds out the possibility that Christians can mine those ideals for 
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arguments supporting the public policies they favor. There may be limits to 
what arguments Christians can find in liberal democratic theory; perhaps 
arguments for the illegality of all abortions, for example, will not be forth-
coming. But given Christian abhorrence of pride, Christians would do better 
to look for and employ such arguments than to run the risk of pride that 
religiously-based political argument poses. 
IV 
I have argued that acts of religiously inspired political advocacy-of the 
use of political power to coerce belief, to purify society or make it more 
Christian-are often acts of pride. Liberalism requires limiting the range of 
values and principles to which political advocacy appeals; compliance with 
at least some liberal principles of political advocacy would preclude political 
arguments premised on the purposes God has for America or on His use of 
some people as instruments in doing His will. Political liberalism therefore 
prevents acts of pride that take the form of religiously inspired advocacy 
appealing to such premises. 
But can liberalism do more than preclude acts of pride? Can it develop 
habits of mind and sentiment that mollify the vice of pride itself? Liberal 
democracy fosters citizens' self-assertion and sense of self-worth; that it does 
so is often thought one of its strengths. The self-assertion and -respect that 
liberal democracy fosters are sometimes believed to be at odds with the 
quality of humility. It might therefore seem that humility, the opposite of 
pride, is a quality of character incompatible with the habits elicited by liberal 
democracy. 
Certainly liberalism is incompatible with habits of servility or excessive 
acquiescence toward other human beings. 34 Countering the pride I located in 
religiously inspired political advocacy does not, however, require a humility 
so abject. Rather, such pride could be effectively contained by coming to 
respect other citizens as reasonable: as capable of deliberating well about 
what conception of a good life to pursue and as capable of participating in 
political argument and honoring the demands of justice.35 This respect for 
others as reasonable suffices to contain the pride discussed earlier because 
the various forms of political advocacy I discussed were all, insofar as they 
were acts of pride, motivated by the belief in or desire for superiority to 
citizens who do not share one's religious views. Advocacy of paternalistic 
policies is motivated in part by the conviction that other citizens cannot 
determine what is for their own good; other forms of advocacy are motivated 
by the presumptuous supposition of nearer proximity to God than one's fel-
low. But there is no reason to think curbing these beliefs and desires requires 
abject humility before other human beings; their replacement by beliefs and 
desires associated with respect for other citizens as reasonable would suffice. 
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To show that liberalism fosters the requisite respect, I borrow arguments from 
John Rawls.36 
The discipline liberalism imposes on political argument requires that some-
one advocating the use of public power, from whatever motive religious or 
otherwise, try to cast her arguments in terms that others could accept even 
without accepting her religious views. This requires an exercise of the moral 
imagination, an attempt to imagine what it would be like to lack our own 
religious reasons to accept the position in question. Regular exercise of the 
moral imagination to ascertain the reasons and motives of another, regularly 
putting ourselves in another's place, as it were, should over time lead us to 
an appreciation of others' ability to grasp and act on moral reasons and 
political convictions. This appreciation, in tum, engenders our respect for 
other citizens as moral agents capable of moral reasoning; it engenders, that 
is, our respect for citizens as reasonableY 
More important in the development of respect for other citizens is the 
reciprocity of liberal political argument. First, if we repeatedly observe that 
others too observe the strictures of political liberalism, we come to appreciate 
how others are restraining themselves and trying to meet us halfway. When 
political liberalism is long and generally adhered to, the recognition that 
others restrain themselves and regard us as reasonable elicits reciprocity on 
our part; it elicits, that is, our regard for them as reasonable. Second, that 
others' adherence to political liberalism makes available goods we could not 
otherwise realize reinforces our respect and good will toward them. Civility 
of argument and the cooperation civility makes possible are important ele-
ments of the common good that would be very difficult to attain without the 
adherence of all to the restraints liberalism imposes on political advocacy. 
Seeing that others work to maintain the conditions of cooperation heightens 
our regard for them as capable of reasonable participation in political argu-
ment. Seeing that they make possible some goods of which we avail ourselves 
elicits or heightens our good will. 
I have argued that dispositions associated with and motivating some acts 
of pride can be ameliorated by the cultivation of respect for one's fellow 
citizens as reasonable. I have further argued that the habit of respect for others 
develops with continued and general adherence to political liberalism. But 
while this respect may restrain pride, is it fittingly described as part of the 
humility to which Christians aspire? 
Christians must conclude that Augustinian liberalism is a politics with 
limited ambitions. It does not claim that a liberal political regime can replace 
pride with truly Christian humility before God. Nor does it claim that the 
mutual respect liberalism engenders comes to fruition in a Christian love of 
neighbor. It aims only at inculcating habits that hold pride and contempt in 
check. Christians who want more humility than this must seek it in the 
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revelation of Divine greatness and in the practices of their churches. Thus 
Augustinian liberalism at best reinforces or prepares the way for the humility 
Christians must learn elsewhere. Its limited ambitions should not, however, 
be held against it, for in this Augustinian liberalism is consonant with 
Augustine's own views. No one was more pessimistic than Augustine about 
reliance on political authority to do more than hold pride in check or to foster 
genuine moral improvement. 38 
Non-Christians and the non-religious too will find Augustinian liberalism 
limited in its ambitions. I have employed Rawlsian arguments to claim that 
liberalism checks pride by fostering mutual respect. I have not, however, 
argued for Rawlsian liberalism nor have I claimed that curbing pride requires 
the high level of mutual respect that would characterize Rawls's well-ordered 
society or Kant's realm of ends. 
I have expressed disagreement with Judith Shklar on a number of points. 
It might now be helpful to indicate a point on which we concur. Shklar's 
defense of liberalism rests on her argument that the habits of liberalism best 
discipline our indulgence in the ordinary vices, especially cruelty. Hers is a 
liberalism of limited moral aspirations that focuses on the evils restrained 
rather than on the virtues elicited. In this I have followed her lead, arguing 
that political liberalism can hold pride in check even if it cannot foster true 
humility. It is a liberalism that should appeal to all who reckon pride a vice, 
but should have special appeal to Christians, who follow Augustine in abhor-
ring it most of all. 
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